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ABSTRACT 
In 1955 only one of the 200 largest industrial corporations in the United States used the title Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) to denote its chief executive. By 1975 all but one of these firms had a 
CEO. This innovation can not reasonably be argued to either have been the result of strategic 
considerations, nor to have had a measurable effect on firm performance; in fact, it is probably 
most accurately described as a fad. But as such, it provides us with a near-perfect test of 
contagion via cohesion, contagion via structural equivalence models, and other explanations of 
diffusion. Relying primarily .upon corporate director interlock data for the period 1955-75, we 
test these explanations and draw conclusions about both the spread of the innovation through the 
intercorporate network as well as diffusion research in general. 
CEO Title Diffusion 
Director Interlocks and Intercorporate Diffusion' 
In the past decade, studies have begun to recognize the impact which corporate board 
director interlocks may have on interorganizational diffusion. While these studies have focused 
on explaining speciiic diffusions, such as the spread of poison pill takeover defenses or the multi- 
divisional corporate form, the fact that a number of such studies find director interlocks to be a 
significant factor suggests that they may be an important causal factor in the diffusion of all 
corporate decisions taken at the corporate board or top management levels. This is an especially 
interesting possibility to explore since it may help answer a question which has been the focus of 
debate among social scientists: What effect do interlocking corporate directorates have of 
corporate behavior? 
There are several common answers to this question. Critics of capitalism suggest that 
director interlocks are a prime mechanism of capitalist class social cohesion (Zeitlin 1974, 1989; 
Domhoff, 1998 [1967]), while a related line of thought (Dornhoff 1998 [1967]; Mizruchi 1982, 
1992; Useem 1984) contends that interlocks at least provide a means to coordinate political and 
economic interests among business elites. A different perspective is that interlocks serve, not the 
interest of a business class, but the institutional needs of corporations by reducing uncertainty 
with respect to needed resources on which they depend. The basic resource dependence model 
(Pfeffer 1974, Pennings, 1980) suggests that interlocks are made to cement access to suppliers, 
academic & legal expertise, and especially capital. In stronger versions of this perspective 
interlocks do more than facilitate access to resources, they allow more powehl  corporations to 
influence or even control the decision-making in other firms. Bank control or financial hegemony 
(Mintz and Schwartz, 1985) models are special versions of resource dependence which perceive 
that interlocks provide financial institutions influence or control over the industrial firms which are 
(at least potential) borrowers of their resources, and through which financial institutions become 
central control organizations for entire regional economies. 
' We are indebted to Mark S. Mizruchi and Linda B. Stearns for their longitudinal study of corporate access to capital through 
director interlocks. We first became aware of the CEO title d i b i o n  &om this study and it provided the data necessary for this 
paper. Their project and this publication have been supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant SBR-9308443). 
Portions of this paper were presented at the INSNA Sunbelt Conference in New Orleans, Februaty 1994, and an earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco, August 1998. 
We would like to thank the many people present at those meetings for their comments and contributions to the present work, 
especially David Krackhardt and Allison Carey. 
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Regardless of which of these models is most accurate, each presumes that director 
interlocks must at least serve as channels of communication between persons in different 
companies. The difision of innovations adopted by boards of directors or by executives are thus 
important to study not only in their own right but because they provide another test of this 
underlying assumption. Diffusion requires transmission of information to potential adopters. If 
.director interlocks are channels of communication between corporate elites - as the above models 
suggest - then we should expect interlocks to play a significant part in these diffusions. 
Prior Studies 
There has been a fair amount of research aimed at understanding the diffusion of board- 
adopted innovations. Taken as a whole these studies are suggestive, but hardly conclusive. In 
explaining difhsion of poison pill takeover defenses, Davis (199 1) found that firms having 
corporate board interlocks ties to corporations which had previously adopted the poison pill were 
significantly more likely to adopt the poison pill themselves. Those having ties to two or more 
adopters were between 1.5 and 2.5 times as likely to adopt as those without ties. In researching 
acquisition behavior, Haunschild (1993) similarly found that the number of acquisitions in the 
previous three years by firms to which a focal firm was tied was a significant factor in predicting a 
firm's own decision to engage in acquisitions. Though the authors offer an alternative 
explanation, astudy by Westphal and Zajac (1997) on board "independence" also offered data 
consistent with the idea that interlocks are key to intercorporate diffusions. Other, non-diffusion 
studies including work on political contributions (Mizruchi, 1992) and organizational philanthropy 
(Galaskieivicz and Burt, 199 1) also suggested that director interlocks serve as channels of 
communication which influence company behavior, but the evidence in these studies was less than 
fully supportive. Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) found that while non-directional ties to 
. previous adopters of the Multidivisional Form (MDF) increased chances of adopting during the 
late MDF adoption period they studied, directional ties to MDF firms actually decreased MDF 
adoption. Work on similar difisions by Fligstein (1985) and by Kosnick (1987) did not produce 
evidence that interlocks were key factors. More importantly, in each of these studies a number of 
other factors affected the likelihood of adopting as strongly or more strongly than did director 
interlocks with prior adopters. For poison pill adopters these included firm size measured by 
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market value, ownership variables, and existence of other takeover deterrents. For acquisitions, 
debt-to-equity ratio was a powefil factor, while a variety of other factors significantly affected 
MDF adoption. 
Why is there not stronger evidence of a director interlock effect? One conclusion which 
the data suggest is that director interlocks play a key role in at least some of these diffusions, but 
they are not the major cause which one would expect if director interlocks were the only channel 
through which the information necessary for these diffusions was flowing. This could be because 
direct channels between adopters are not required for adoption since adoption-relevant 
information is usually widely available, as has been suggested by Burt (1987), or because alternate 
channels exist which reduce the impact of director interlocks. However, while we believe that 
while both of these might play a role in mitigating and/or diluting the role of the director 
interlocks, we argue that researchers' tendency to conflate two distinct sub-processes within the 
difision process is also to blame. In this paper we hope to illustrate how the fill import of 
director interlocks on these difisions may have been underestimated by these studies of 
interorganizational diffusion because of this conceptual conflation of distinct sub-processes within 
the diffUsion process. Our goal with this paper is to use data on the difision of the title CEO 
throughout the American corporate network as an example which we think allows for the 
separation of these two sub-processes, toward the goal of better illuminating the impact of 
director interlocks. 
A Theory of Two Diffusion Sub-processes: Contact and Choice 
When first trying to understand why there was not stronger evidence of a director 
interlock effect in board-adopted diffusions, one of the first things we noticed about existing 
studies is that each of them involves the difision of a substantively important innovation. By 
substantively important we mean that in each of these cases a firm's decision to adopt or not had 
clear, non-trivial costs and consequences to the firm, and that related to this, the utility of the 
adoption varied across firms. For example, in Davis' poison pill study, firm size has an impact on 
the probability of adoption because larger firms were almost immune from the threat of takeover, 
the primary motive for adopting the poison pill, while smaller Fortune 500 firms were not. Even 
more interesting, when looking at the sum of this research it appears that there is a rough negative 
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correlation in these studies between the substantive importance of the adoption studied and the 
reported significance of director interlocks. 
Even by focusing on substantive importance, we had already implicitly marked a 
distinction between variables that were included because of their effect on the utility of adoption 
decision and those, such as director interlocks, that were included for other reasons, most 
obviously because they provide the access to information about a potential adoption. From there 
it was only a small step to the central argument of this paper, that what these studies had been 
treating as a single diffusion process should more properly be conceptualized as two distinct sub- 
processes. We call these the contact process and the choice (or choice-resistance) process. The 
contact process is that part of the diffusion wherein each company is exposed to the elements of 
adoption or contagion. The choice-resistance process is that part of the diffusion after contact 
has occurred in which a company chooses to adopt or takes actions to resist or avoid adopting. 
Any adoption requires access to a contagion. Whether or not the contagion includes a 
physical object, it nearly always involves the transfer of information (Marsden and Friedkin: p. 
129). Access to the contagion is in some instances sufficient to adopt, but in most instances there 
is the added necessity that the agent succumb to the adoption or choose to adopt. Thus, we 
conceptually separate the diffusion process into two parts: a contact process that focuses on the 
way agents make contact with a contagion, including information, and a choice-resistance process 
that .focuses on the factors that make them more or less likely to adopt after coming into contact. 
' . In an epidemiological analogy, the first is exposure to the disease while the second is a process of 
either showing symptoms or remaining healthy. Diffusion processes vary with respect to these 
process. In some instances one or the other of these processes may be trivial. If there is no choice 
or resistance, as might occur with an extremely virulent disease, contact alone may be destiny, but 
this seems uncommon in the context of corporate diffusions where most adoptions are voluntary 
and involve some choice. When contact is nearly universally available the diffusion process 
reduces to a question of choosing or resisting the innovation. In most corporate diffusions, either 
both contact and choice processes are significant, or just the choice process is sigruficant2. 
- - 
Burt (1987, see also Marsden and Friedkm, 1993) contends the latter is generally true of corporate diffusions., a view evident 
in his interpretation of cohesion and structural equivalence measures. Cohesion suggests to Burt "normative understanding of 
adoption's costs and benefits" that emerge h m  discussions and shared attitudes that may result kom social proximity, both of 
which lead to adopting similarities. Structural equivalence suggests similarity of social environment, thus similar status, thus 
competitive pressure, which leads to similar adoptions (Burt, 1987: p. 1291-94). When contagion is widely available the 
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To return to the epidemiology analogy, the problem with prior studies is that they focus 
on whether companies show symptoms, but they have no way of controlling for when (or even If) 
firms were exposed to the contagion. That is, they have conflated the two distinct sub-processes. 
The likely result of this is that they have incorrectly estimated the true effects of contact and 
choice process variables relative to each other. Director interlocks may be an important contact 
mechanism, but probably have little influence on choice or resistance phase. Most other variables 
used affect decision-making, but seldom do they have contact implications. Ifwe assume that the 
relative importance of contact and choice processes varies across diffusions, we should expect to 
find interlocks most significant when contact is most important and choice most trivial. When 
choice is most important, the impact of interlocks may be suppressed or "drowned" by 
performance-related factors which influence choice and resistance, despite the fact that interlocks 
serve a prerequisite contact hnction in many of these adoptions. 
It is somewhat surprising that researchers in board-adopted intercorporate difision have 
not made a distinction between separate sub-process within diffusion, because when we sought 
previous work that did make such a distinction, we found that Everett Rogers (1983 [1962]), 
widely regarded as the seminal authority on diffusion research, not only divided diffusion into 
several stages but drew explicit attention to the lag between what he called the knowledge stage 
(that is, the contact process)and the decision or implementation stages, which together roughly 
correspond to our choice process. A work by Strang (1993) emphasizing the difference between 
interpretation of cohesion and equivalence is as competing bases for mimesis. But this interpretation is only possible because 
Burt contends access to contagion is generally not a problem: "With the omnipresence of mass media and people paid to 
disseminate information on an innovation, obtaining information is less a problem.. . than finding trustworthy information; even 
worse, the problem lies in finding ways to ignore as much as possible of the otherwise overwhelming horde of facts." (Burt, 
1987: p. 1289) How could equivalence function unless companies had general access to information about their competitors? 
Contact as a basis of transmittal of contagion, the focus of what we have called the contact subprocess, is assumed away in the 
overabundance of information. In this view, adoption of any innovation, whether best explained through cohesion or 
equivalence, is viewed solely as an effect on the choice subprocess. 
Our view differs. We argue that conwon information is not always as available as Burt contends. If we recognize sifted 
and trustworthy information as a contagion transmitted in a contact process, then contact is pot as trivial as Burt would have us 
believe. In this case it is not access to information per se that constitutes contagion, but access to evaluated information. Free 
of the assumption of abundant mformation and m a k q  a distinction between contact and choice processes, we offer a Merent 
interpretation: when access is nearly universally available, diffUsions could be affected by equivalence or cohesion in the way 
Burt suggests, but under the more prevalent condition of restricted access to contagon, cohesion typically has effect through 
direct transmission of the adoption information from f m  to f m .  Though he assumes all large corporations were aware of 
poison pills fairly early because of extensive media coverage and promotion of poison pills by investment banks and law fums, 
Davis (1991) generally agrees with our view when he argues that ties to adopters are important as sources of "trustworthy 
information" (see Burt: p. 1289). He also concludes there is "no evidence that firms imitated others in their industry, as the 
structural equivalence model of ditkio! would suggest" (Davis: p. 608). Davis suggests some diffusions may be driven by 
cohesion and others by equivalence, and he claims the interlock network "supports a kind of stability or social order among 
corporations... [and] provides a diffusion mechanism for information and Srrategies" [emphasis added]. 
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choice-theoretic and network (or institutional) accounts may also be seen as suggesting that 
diffusions vary regarding contact and choice processes. 
A Method for Isolating Contact Factors 
Assuming that substantive variables may in fact be suppressing estimates of the impact of 
contact process variables such as director interlocks, we would prefer to study the sub-processes 
in isolation. How can this be done? The best way to do this would probably by studying the 
diffusion of knowledge of a contagion rather than the actual adoption of the contagion, or by 
performing a dual-event history analysis of contact and choice. Unfortunately, most corporate 
diffusion studies are done retrospectively and data about contact is nearly always less readily 
available than data concerning actual adoption, which is probably the main reason that the two 
process have been conflated in the first place. An alternative strategy would be to research a 
diffusion where choice-resistance was trivial. If adoption hinged almost entirely on contagion, 
then adoption data would approximate contact data. 
What kind of diffusion would this be? The best situation would be a "no-brainer"; a 
situation where, once in contact with a diffusion, adoption is rapid and (nearly) automatic. That 
is, when an innovation is irresistible and everyone at risk to adopt is equal capable of, and eager 
to, adopt. In epidemiology, this is the case of the extremely virulent disease, but in the world of 
board-adopted interorganizational diffusions, we are not sure what would constitute a parallel 
case. Fortunately fads, those situations where adoption has almost no consequences and 
whatever consequences do exist are perceived by the adopters as positive, are only a little less 
ideal. While adoption might not be rapid or absolutely automatic, there would be little reason not 
to adopt, and little or no systematic variation in the adoption decision. Thus, for purposes of 
isolating the impact which director interlocks or any other contract process variables have upon 
interfirm diffusion, we suggest studying diffusions that almost wholly lack substantive importance 
to the adopting firms and are adopted as fads, lacking a sigmficant choice-resistance process. 
The CEO Title Wave: A Contact-Only Diffusion? 
Arguably, one possible real-world example of such a fad adoption is the diffusion of the 
CEO title. Today, Chief Executive Officers, or CEOs, are found at the top of the organizational 
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chart of nearly every large or mid-size U.S. Corporation, as well as most international firms. Yet 
this was not always so. While the term "CEO" is part of both the business and common . 
vocabulary today, before the middle of this century companies were headed by Chairmen or 
Presidents, and the title Chief Executive Officer did not exist. Only two Fortune 200 industrial 
companies had CEOs at the beginning of 1955, but by 1966 over half of these same companies 
had a designated CEO, and by the late 1970s.nearly all these companies had adopted use of the 
CEO title. 
To determine whether the CEO title difision is an appropriate case, we must first have 
some idea of why it spread. Work on organizational isomorphism and innovation adoption 
(Fligstein, 1985; Palmer et al, 1993) suggest various explanations for adopting an organizational 
form or innovation, which we have grouped into three categories: (1) what DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) refer to as competitive isomorphism3, that is perceived performance improvement in terms 
of sales, profitability, survival, growth, reduced transaction costs (Williamson, 1975), or other 
tangible benefit; (2) political motivations within or between firms; and (3) mimetic or normative 
isomorphic processes. 
With respect to the CEO title difision specifically there are two extant explanations 
which fall roughly into categories one and three above. First, there are those (Chandler, 1976; 
McDermott, 1991) who speculate that the CEO title was adopted to designate the single 
operating head of a firm in the contexts of multidivisional form, team leadership, or variance in the 
official roles of President and chairman4. Adoption is explained as a way of reducing a minor 
transaction cost. Second, there are those who assume the CEO title is best understood as a fad: 
mimetic or normative isomorphism. 
We have found no serious investigation of the topic which supports or undermines either 
of these two theories, but after reviewing the evidence we discuss here, we have concluded that 
the mimetic or normative isomorphism explanation is most likely. First and foremost, we have 
found no indication that the CEO title has any non-trivial economic benefit or cost to adopters. 
DiMaggio and Powell coin the term competitive isomorphism, but indicate (p. 149) they follow Meyer (1 979) and Fennell 
(1980). 
It is interesting to note that the years when Chandler claims General Motors or other companies had a CEO, the official 
designation in all sources we located was still President. For example, Chandler asserts '% 1923 ... Pierce appointed Sloan as 
president and Chief Executive OfEcer [of GM]" (1976: p.47 62 restated p.48). Since use of this title is not confirmed in 
Moody's or any other source to our knowledge, we conclude Chandler uses the term to indicate the scope of Sloan's authority 
rather than his formal title. 
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We have found no studies that relate the designation of a CEO to any measure of corporate 
performance, nor have we found an hint that there was a substantive reason for adopting the CEO 
title. Discussions with an early CEO and a business source personally familiar with several early 
adopting companies suggest adoption of the CEO title was of virtually no importance to firms. 
These source do not remember it being a significant decision at the time, but agree that a simple 
desire to differentiate between the President and Chairman may have been the moti3e to designate 
a CEO. As one of our informants explained, "No new hnction was created" (Interview, 1994). 
This is consistent with the absence of the terms "Chief Executive Officer" or "CEO" in the 
business press until several years into the adoption process. Certainly if adopting a CEO was of 
much importance to businesses, it would be mentioned in the business press, but a review of 
literature on Chief Executives yields no reference to Chief Executive Officers or CEOs in the 
academic, business, or popular press prior until the mid- 1 960s5. The earliest use of the term 
"CEO" or "Chief Executive Officer" which we could find in a title or as an index subject was a 
1970 Harvard Business Review article by Eastlack and McDonald. Curiously, these early articles 
use the title CEO as if it had always existed. This suggests that the advent of the title went largely 
unheralded and unnoticed - a new label for an existing concept. This might be explained by the 
possibility that the term "Chief Executive" was used informally among the business community 
prior to its formal implementation as an official title6. Again however, recollections fiom 
individuals well-placed among early adopters suggest that this was not so. "[The CEO Title] 
began to come into play in the late 1940s and early Fifties" (Telephone Interview, 1994). Their 
personal accounts match well with the record that emerges fiom formal sources, with no 
suggestion of a period of informal usage prior to the emergence of the formal title. 
Second, there is no reason to believe that interorganizational pressures or coercive 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) were a factor. There is no theory explaining the CEO 
' A few publications, mostly authored and published by Harold Stieglitz and the Conference Board or appearing in the Wall 
Street Journal, use the term "Chief Executives" in the early 1960s, a term which other sources continued with throughout the 
decade. In these sources the term means not only those with the Chief Executive Oficer title, which only a handll  bore at that 
time, but "that individual whom the owners of a business - or their representatives - give the power to run the business" 
(Steiglitz, 1961 rno.2 141; Steiglib and Janger, 1963). That is, the corporate head whether they were Chairman, President, or 
other. These publications also attest to the variety of mles and functions in which the Chief Executive may serve, which again 
suggests the title lacked substance especially since those with a formal CEO title, who were always also either the President or 
Ch;urman, performed duties similar to those performed in other companies by persons who held only the title of President or 
Chairman. Baran and Sweezy's Monopolv Ca~ital  appears to have one of the earliest (1966) references to "Chief Executive 
Otficers" @. 15-16) by which they also appear to mean all top managers, not the single operating head, of a corporation. 
Another possibility which we have yet to explore is that use of the title transferred born the military. One of the very early 
adopters had a prominent military officer among their directors. 
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title in this way, we could find no law or tax incentive to adopting the CEO title at that time, there 
is again the lack of media attention, and it is difficult to imagine what benefit a firm would gain by 
pressuring other firms to designate a CEO. The CEO title appears to be an innovation largely 
without consequence to adopters. 
Which brings us to the third alternative. Companies may adopt an innovation such as the 
CEO title simply through emulation of other companies, or because the innovations become 
normative in the population, the media, or the educational institutions which train corporate 
officers, processes which D i a g g i o  and Powell (1983) refer to respectively as mimetic 
isomorphism and normative isomorphism. Together, these explanations are most consistent with 
the idea that the CEO title is a fad7. 
Does this mean the CEO title was a contact-only diffusion? The primary difference 
between mimetic and normative isomorphism is the availability and locus of contact with the 
innovation. Mimetic models suppose that contact is in the form of knowledge from or about 
other organizations, but normative models suggest widespread availability through media or 
education. The lack of media attention to the CEO title until relatively late is one clue that the 
CEO title diffused more mimeiically, rather than normatively, but stronger evidence comes from a 
more formal analysis of early adoptions. 
As part of his classic paper on difFbsion, Burt (1987; see also Coleman et al, 1977) 
reviews the distinction between diffusion with contagion and diffusion without contagion. 
Paradoxically, a dfision-without-contagion model applies under two conditions: lack of 
contagion in the diffusion process, or contagion so widely available that the probability of contact 
approaches un iv .  On the other hand, diffusion-with-contagion occurs when contagion, access to 
information or objects of diffusion, is available only through a limited supply of agents, typically 
those who already have adopted. 
An informal survey of business school faculty, primarily those affiliated with the University of Michigan though including 
others, lent added support to our view of the title as unsubstantive and that it spread due to mimetic adoption. Most of the 
experts surveyed agreed that the spread of the CEO title was probably best understood as a fad with no real impact on firm 
longevity, profitability, or other measures of corporate success. As one source remarked, "It probably was a case of follow the 
leader. What big, aspiring company could be without a CEO if General Motors and a few other big firms had them?'' 
As may be the case when distribution of access or information is far faster than the acceptance of the diffusion which depends 
on it (e.g. popular media reports or electronic communication concerning a fad) so that access is commonly available before 
people or orgmimtions actually adopt, or when one set of information or objects is the contagion for a resulting adoption and 
may temporally precede those objects by a relatively long period of time. 
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Figure la: Diffusion Without Contagion 
/ 
Diffusion without contagion "is driven by two factors: [Corporations'] predisposition to 
adopt independently.. . and the proportion of [corporations] available to adopt," (Burt: p. 1303). 
Thus the expected rate of diffusion is a hnction of the proportion at risk to adopt weighted by 
their propensities to adopt. In diffusion with contagion, however, "the rate of diffusion is given 
by the [previous] two factors, ... weighted by the extent to which the innovation is already 
adopted" (Burt: p. 1303), assuming that anyone who has already adopted is potentially contagious. 
This is because adoption is influenced by contact with others who have already adopted. The 
cumulative frequency difision curve, now weighted by the probability of contact with contagious 
agentsg, dramatically changes from an inverted-J curve to an S-curve, as illustrated in Figure 1 a 
and lb. (Coleman et al, 1977 [1957]; Burt, 1987). 
Burt's "weighted by the extent to which the innovation is already adoptedw simplifies this by assuming that the probability of 
with contagious agents is approximated by the proportion who have already adopted. 
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Figure lb: Diffusion With Contagion 
Following earlier diffusion work, Burt (1987) represents the expected rate of without- 
contagion diffusion using the equation &/dt = k(l-y), while diffusion with contagion is 
represented as &/dt = ky(1-y), where k is the average adopters predisposition to adopt, y is the 
proportion of the population already adopted, and (I-y) is the proportion yet to adopt. The latter 
equation incorporates the additional y to weight the equation by an estimated probability of 
contacting the contagion. 
In arguing against the likelihood of with-contagion diffusion in Coleman et ars  data (1977 
[1957]), Burt notes "a steep rate of diffusion need not indicate social contagion ... [it can] be 
generated by strong personal preferences toward adoption.. . the most distinctive evidence of 
social contagion is the initial period of slow diffusion among pioneer adopters." (Burt, 1987: 
p. 1304) In other words, the existence of the lower tail which distinguishes the S-curve from the 
inverted J-curve is the most important clue in determining if a diffusion is with-contagion. As the 
proportion of previous adopters increases, the with-contagion curve looks more and more like the 
without-contagion curve. That is, as contagion becomes widely available, mimetic isomorphism 
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becomes normative isomorphism. This transition suggests that specific contacts may become less 
relevant the fbrther a diffusion progresses'0. The early part of a fad, when there are still few 
adopters, is the best place to observe whether it is transmitted mimetically or normatively. 
The difision of the CEO title among the Fortune 200 largest industries of 1955, the S- 
curve presented in Figure 2, bears strong visual resemblance to the difision-with-contagion 
model, supporting the view that it was mimetic. We can surmise that adoption of the CEO title 
was probably contact-dependent, relying on information difised through specific agents and was 
not, at least early on, information generally available among corporate boards. That, again, is 
congruent with the lack of published information on the CEO title during early years of the 
difision, and with the personal accounts of our telephone interviewees. 
To review, we are led to believe that the CEO case approaches the ideal of a contact-only 
difision for a variety of reasons. First, the only articulated non-mimetic reason to adopt the title 
appears to be the trivial, but positive, benefit of clariflmg to outsiders who is the corporate head. 
Second, most experts seem to agree it was a mimetic process. Third, adoption of the CEO title 
was nearly universal after several years, suggesting the absence of any substantive rational for 
some companies not to adopt. Finally, the shape of the cumulative frequency distribution makes it 
clear there was a meaningfbl contact process, so it is entirely plausible that difision of the CEO 
title was strictly mimetic, a true fad. If so, it might offer far stronger evidence than previous 
studies of the importance interlocks have for corporate difision because there would be no 
substantive variables to suppress their apparent effect, a possibility which we test. . . 
Some Preliminary Evidence for Director Interlocks 
Up to this point we have not discussed at all the plausibility of director interlocks versus 
other possible agents of contagion for the CEO title. The simplest and most plausible agents of 
contact are usually assumed, as in Burt's formulation, to be previous adopters. In this case that 
means other firms already having designated a CEO. Communication between firms, of course, 
means communication between people in those firms. For decisions made by the upper echelon of 
- -  
'O Which may explain Coleman ez ars (1977) finding that sociometric choices among physicians a ix ted  the date of 
Tetracycline adoption among early adopters, but did not have a sigdicant impact on later adopters. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative CEO Title Adoptions, 1955-1976 
executives or by directors, director interlocks are a natural suspect because they are the most 
obvious of only a few channels which offer the necessary connectivity. Still, alternatives exist. 
Before we conducted a full analysis, we began with a preliminary investigation to get some 
idea of whether interlocks were part of the story. This investigation suggested to us that our line 
of inquiry was likely to bear fruit. We first selected the first eight companies which adopted the 
title CEO and we researched the board interlock ties among the directors of each of them. The 
results were dramatic. 
Figure 3a shows there were a total five interlocks in the group, of a possible 
twenty-eight, one of which was a double interlock. Nearly every one of these companies was 
interlocked with at least one other adopter at the time of their adoption1'. To ascertain if this rate 
of interlocks was typical of non-adopting companies we compared these first eight adopters with 
" If we include an interlock between Container Corp. and FMC that occurred just one year after FMC's adoption, which might 
suggest earlier communication between these boards, then every company is interlocked to at least one other adopter! 
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a random sample of eight other companies from the Fortune 200 of 1955. For this sample we 
considered all interlocks for these firms occurring between 1955 and 1963, the years during 
which the first set of companies adopted the CEO title. As illustrated in Figure 3b, there was only 
one interlock12. Accounts from our telephone interviews agreed with the perception that 
interlocks do serve as sources of some information. When asked directly about the CEO title, 
Fig. 3a. Interlocks among 8 Early Adopters Fig. 3b. Interlocks among 8 Non-Adopters 
each of our respondents said they could not recall the title being spread this way, but neither of 
them ruled the possibility out (Telephone interviews, 1994). From the striking differences in 
interlock density between early adopters and a comparison group of firms, we assumed that 
director interlocks are the primary channel of contact for this difksion especially in early 
adoptions, although other contact mechanism might also be in effect in later time periods. 
'' There were also two interlocks that occurred between the sample of non-adopters and the adopting corporations (eg. 
Colgate-Palmolive & Container Corp, Shell Oil & FMC Corp.) 
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Contact, Choice, and CEO Title Diffusion: A Hypothesis 
If the CEO diffusion is an unusual instance where the choice process is minimal and the 
overall diffusion relies heavily on contact, and if director interlocks are the primary mechanism of 
contact, we expect director interlocks to be an especially strong predictor of CEO title adoption. 
HYPOTHESIS: THE EXISTENCE OF INTERLOCKS BETWEEN FOCAL COMPANIES 
AND PREVIOUS ADOPTERS OF THE CEO TITLE SHOULD STRONGLY PREDICT 
ADOPTION BY A COMPANY, ESPECIALLY IN THE EARLIER YEARS OF THE 
ADOPTION. 
If we are correct that CEO diffusion is predominantly a contact process, economic and 
strategy related variables which impact the choice process in most corporate dfisions should not 
effect CEO adoption. While we cannot exhaust all such variables, we have collected data on 
select variables of this variety. It is our expectation is that each of them will be insignificant: (1) 
size, (2) profitability, (3) market value, (4) debt level, (5) industrial classification. Unlike poison 
pill adoption where size offered an alternative form of protection (Davis, 1991), we have no 
reason to believe that size (among Fortune 200 firms) should effect CEO adoption. We have 
found no studies or stated rationale relating the existence of a CEO to any measure of corporate 
success such as sales, debt level, market value, profitability, or longevity, nor to differences in 
industry classification. These variables are included in the analysis with the expectation that they 
will not be significant. 
Nor do we have reason to believe adoption of the CEO title would be more beneficial to 
or common among any one segment of a firm. Nevertheless, following Fligstein's (1985) findings 
of a relationship between the background of the corporate head and adoption of the Multi- 
Divisional Form, we will control for the background of the corporate head. 
CEO Diffusion Data and Method 
Mizruchi and Steams collected data on interlocking directorates between each of the 1955 
Fortune largest 200 industrial companies for the years 1955-199413 using Standard & Poor's 
- - - 
l3 From 1955-1994 a significant number of these companies were acquired and merged into other companies, went out of 
business, or d e r  other forms of corporate death and were dropped from the dataset. Corporate mergers where the business 
and management of company fiom the dataset constituted an ovenvhelrmng majority of the business of the merged company 
were continued in the dataset. Companies where the business and management of a company constituted approximately half of 
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Register. The name of each director for each company in each year were entered into a database 
where each record was a director-corporate-year, as was an indication of whether they were 
outside or inside directors, and their title if they were President, Chairman, and/or CEO'~. These 
data were cleaned by cross-checking similar names using Who 's Who in America biographical 
information and standardizing all spellings of identical persons' names. Then a count was made of 
the number of shared directors for each dyad of companies, and a count for each corporation-year 
of the number of other companies the focal company was interlocked with that had previously 
adopted the CEO title and the number that did not15. To this were added financial data, SIC 
codes, board size, board composition, and other data. Meanwhile the biography of each 
corporate head was researched in Who 's Who in America, and data included for each corporation- 
year. 
Our preliminary investigation of early adopters revealed significant shortcomings in data 
on the CEO title in Standard & Poor 's. In cleaning and cross-checking the data against other 
sources we found that while the director lists were usually very accurate, indications of whether 
there was a CEO often did not appear until significantly after mention in other sources. We dealt 
with this problem by adding names and dates from Moody 's, and since that was not consistently 
accurate either, cross-referenced the earliest CEO candidate from each firm either against Who 's 
Who in ~ m e r i c a ' ~ .  Analyses were run using the earliest data from any of the three sources. 
The total dataset (1955-1994) covers a total of 6454 corporation-years. Since few CEO 
title adoptions occur after 197617, we truncate the dataset in that year. So that each record 
represents a company- year a t  risk, companies were deselected from the data set the year after 
their adoption of the CEO title. Two companies in the dataset adopted prior to 1955: Container 
Corp. of America and Curtis ~ublishing". In 26 years, there are 18 companies which are right- 
the merged company were replaced in the dataset aRer the merge with a new record for the resulting company. This resulted in 
9 additional corporations in the dataset. 
14 In fact, it was through cleaning the data for Miauchi and Sterns that the diffusion of the CEO title initially came to our 
attention. 
l5 A very small number of companies, having adopted a CEO at some point, later had one or more years without a CEO. 
l6 Who's Who in America, a self-reported biographical resource, offered an added challenge since corporate heads had a 
tendency to retrodate designation as CEO to the date of their appointment as President or Charman, a further indication the 
title had no new significance to those involved. Listings retrodated more than 1 year kom publication were disregarded in 
favor of publication year.   very ~ o o d ~ ' . s  or SdV first CEO candidate was cross-checked against Who's Who, and usually the 
preceding head of the corporation was also checked to confirm he did not hold the CEO title previously. 
l7 Eight surviving companies fail to adopt by 1976. 
l8 The earliest adopter, Container Corp., first had a CEO in 1947. With only two companies adopting prior to 1955, we do.not 
believe lef ienming is a sigdicant problem. 
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censored due to company death prior to adoption, which we assume to be random. This yields an 
operating N of 223 1 corporation-years. 
wltie to adopter 
All Companies 
no tie to adopter 
Figure 4. Observed Rate of Adopting CEO Title by Year, 1955-76 
Figure 4 presents-the observed rates of CEO title adoption by year and Figure 5 presents 
the raw number of adoptions by year. Based on these figures and the cumulative frequency 
distribution shown in Figure 2, we divided the difision into four periods: (1) an early period with 
adoption rates below 10% fiom 1955-1961, (2) an early middle period where adoption rates climb 
dramatically fiom 1962- 1965, the midpoint of the difision, (3) a late middle period fiom the 
midpoint to the approximate inflection point 1966- 1971, and (4) a late period where rates vary 
greatly year to year due in part to the small remaining number of non-adopters 1972-1976. In 
Figure 2, we see that these periods correspond approximately to segments between the inflection 
points which divide the cumulative fiequency S-curve into a lower tail, increasing adoptions 
phase, decreasing adoptions phase, and upper tail. 
Our method is an event history analysis of a single, non-repeating event. The annual 
publication of our data sources and number of co-occurring adoptions makes a discrete time 
model preferable (Yamaguchi, 199 1; Allison, 1984). Since the original dependent variable, 
adoption of the CEO title, is binary, we use (SPSS) logistic regression to compute Maximum 
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. 
Figure 5. Number of CEO Title Adoptions by Year, 1955-76 
Likelihood Estimates for the independent variables in each model. This avoids difficulties caused 
by bounded variables when using a linear model by taking a logit transformation to make our 
dependent variable the logit or log-odds hazard probability of adopting the CEO title. 
We allow separate estimates of the hazard rate constant and yearly slope within each time 
period rather than assume a constant for the whole period or use a series of estimates for each 
year. This is done by using the period variable, YearCat, as a categorical variable, and using an 
interaction of a year-in-period, YrInPhaS, variable with the period variable. 
The primary independent variable is a binary indicator of having ties to previous adopters, 
TxAnyBn. Some models use a dummy variable TxAnyX2 to indicate multiple ties. Interactions 
with the period variable allow for effects to differ across periods, and interactions with the year- 
in-phase allow the effects of a tie to increase with time in each period. 
The distribution of number of employees, sales, and long-term debt, earnings, and assets 
are skewed in any given year and are not-independent of time. The natural log was taken of each 
of these variables to normalize the skew. To control for annual change, the variables were 
standardized as z-score deviations from the expected value for the year, derived by regressing the 
variable on time. These variables are coded as Empl-Z, Sales-Z, Earn-2, Assets-Z, and Debt-Z. 
Reported results are for unlagged variables. Analyses with lagged data were run and proved no 
more significant. 
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To assess the impact of changes in performance the change in Earn-Z and in Sales-Z, the 
extent to which a company climbed or dropped in the distribution between years, were included as 















Correlations Earn-D Sales-D SicCat HdCarcat 
Earn-D 1 .OOO 
Sales-D .435 1.000 
SicCat -.010 -.007 1.000 
HdCarCat .041 -.007 .lo9 1 .OOO 
There are a number of SIC codes in the data set, many of which are represented by a small 
number of companies in this dataset. Therefore SIC has been recoded as SicCat, with all 
industries in the 1000-3999 range grouped solely by first digit (i.e. 1,2,3) and all other industries 
put in category 4. Multiple aspects of the corporate head's biography are available. One coding 
is HdISpec which codes firms C,I,J respectively if they are headed by someone promoted from 
within the company, within the industry, or from outside the industry. HdCarCat, codes company 
chief executives from financial (#1 l), manufacturing (#12), sales (# 13), legal (#15), and 
unspecified (#16) backgrounds within the firm, from financial institutions (#20), outside industrial 
firms (#lo), and other backgrounds (#50). Hdbario is a reduced form of this variable that codes 
firms B,I,O respectively if headed by a bank officer, insider (modal), or outside director. 
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There are some sigruficant correlations between certain of the independent variables. 
Asset-Z, DebtZ, Earn - Z, Empl-Z, and Sales-Z are highly correlated with one another. In some 
models they appear together, but they are also compared independently in models V-VII. Earn_D 
and Sales - D are correlated, and YearCat is somewhat correlated with YrInPhas and TxAnyBn. 
Results and Interpretation 
Table 2 presents the results of several different models of event history analysis. Model I 
includes only level and slope effects for each time period. Following these effects across models 
we observe that the third and usually the fourth time periods have a significantly higher hazard 
rate than the first period. Firms are from 6 to 14 times as likely to adopt in periods three and four 
depending on the model. The difference between time periods one and two is less severe, and not 
sigdicant in most models. In most time periods, the annual slope is either not significant or only 
marginally so, except in period two where each additional year increases the probability of 
adopting. This is the early middle stage of the di&sion where the rate of adoption is increasing 
annually. 
Models II and III add the independent variable and allow separate estimates across the 
four periods. The significance of ties to previous adopters ranges from p=.011 to just above 
p=.001 depending on other variables in the model. The general, though somewhat weaker effect 
appears to hold for periods three and period four19, but not for period two. Curiously, in d l  
models the effect of having a tie to a previous adopter during period two is not only insignificant, 
but tends to give worse odds than not having a tie! With this remarkable exception, however, the 
data offer strong support for the importance of director interlocks as a channel of contagion, 
especially in the earliest phase of the difision. Selected models are shown in Table 3. In the 
initial stages of the difision companies with a tie to a previous adopter are minimally 2.3 times as 
likely to adopt, and according to most models between 3 and 4.5 times as likely to adopt. This is 
an even stronger multiplier effect of director interlocks than was reported in Davis' (1 991) study. 
Period Four, with few remaining companies has the most volatile adoption rates. This is reflected in slightly higher standard 
errors for most estimators. 
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Table 2.a 
0 Models Ia, IIa, IIla use an a h a t e  Yearcat breakdown. 
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Table 2.c 
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Table 3. odds Multipliers of Having a Tie to Previous Adopter. 
Model III Mode1 XIV Model XV 
Period One 3.18 4.43 3.94 
Period Two 0.81 0.83 0.82 
Period Three 1.57 1.76 1.73 
Period Four 4.06 3.46 3.14 
Models Ia, 11% IIIa (shown in Table 2) are equivalent but with an alternate year 
categorization: Period 1 from 1955-60, Period 2 from 1961-66, Period 3 from 1967-70, and 
Period 4 from 1971-76. The lack of substantial difference between these models and the primary 
year catergorization shows that the effect is not an artifact of a particular scheme for 
distinguishing time periods. Altering the variables included in the model has some impact on the 
significance and multiplier effect (as shown in Table 3) but in each model director interlocks to 
prior adopters remains significant. Consistent with our argument nearly all of these other 
variables fail to be significant in any model. A few are marginally significant. 
The effect of each set of competitive isomorphism variables is explored in models IV-X, 
shown in Table 2. Model XIV is a full model as is XV where the YrInPhas variable set is reduced 
to a single slope with a dummy to allow a separate slope for period two, based on lack of effects 
in earlier models. Model XVI, where TxAnyBn is weakest, is the pared down model including 
only significant variables. 
Discussion 
The marginal significance of some substantive variables suggest CEO title diffision does 
notfilly approach the ideal contact-only (i.e. simple mimesis) difision, but it appears to come 
close. However, the overall lack of explanatory power on the part of the variables included, and 
the dramatic significance of the contact variable, director interlocks, especially in period one, 
suggests the basic soundness of our interpretation. In sum, the CEO title diffision is a good 
approximation of a difision by contact alone, and as such has given us one of the strongest 
findings yet on the importance of director interlocks to corporate difisions. 
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The only especially unusual result is the strange pattern of period two where there is no 
benefit of having ties to previous adopters and in fact there may be a slight disadvantage. This is 
also the only period which has a significant annual slope, which is not too surprising since this is 
where the fad is really catching on. But what explains the effect of TxAnyBn during this period? 
We can only speculate. Perhaps this is related to the first appearances of the CEO title concept in 
business press. Period two is from 1962 through 1965. It is in 1963 that the very first mentions 
of Chief Executive Officer reach the press. Perhaps the idea became public knowledge among the 
big business community immediately prior to this publication. That would level the playing field 
considerably. But if that is the case, then what accounts for return of the effect in periods three 
and four? Because there are so few companies left in the final period, any one company might 
affect the estimates, but there is no refuting the improved odds of having a tie to an adopter 
during the third period. By this time most companies are interlocked with at least one adopter. 
Perhaps many of the companies without ties to adopters are isolates or fringe firms in the 
corporate network generally. The period three effect may be a proxy for general corporate 
connectivity, in which case these companies may still not have heard about or care about the CEO 
title innovation. Put in other words, our basic premise may be undermined beginning in the 
second period because information about the adoption is available fiom sources other than those 
who have adopted previously. 
Although the uncertainty surrounding period two is a potential hole in our argument, 
generally we believe the data support our contention that corporate difiiisions consist of two 
conceptually distinct processes: contact and choice. The data are largely consistent with these 
assumptions. The strong multiplier and significance of the TxAnyBn variable and insignificance of 
those variables which would suggest competitive isomorphism (i.e. a choice process) is at work, 
support this view. Even if period two introduces a question mark, our argument holds for the 
earliest adoption period. The importance of director interlocks, which may have been suppressed 
by previous studies, lies in their office which provides a unique vantage for channeling corporate 
contagion. Future work on corporate diffusions should take account of this division when they 
model the diffusion process. We believe future studies that do so may reveal an even stronger 
role played by director interlocks. 
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